University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and
Interviews

Mike Mansfield Papers

12-8-1954

Germany and the Future of Europe
Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Mansfield, Mike 1903-2001, "Germany and the Future of Europe" (1954). Mike Mansfield Speeches,
Statements and Interviews. 120.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches/120

This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Mike Mansfield Papers at ScholarWorks at University
of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and Interviews by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

FOR RELr.AS .... - - - - -

G;:. Hi·A1'Y Al\D

Th~

FUTtJR.:.:: OF LUROP.!:

(Text of
Fall l·~cting of Tae Acadcey of
December 8, 1954, Eotel Astor ,
In the interim bet\.feen t!.e rej0ction of the ....uropoon Defense
Community by the French parliament ru1d the London- Paris Conferences,
I had a conversation \.fith Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in Germany .

l'-1r .

Adenaucr made a significant conrrncnt in discussi ng the collapse of iDC ,
11

a col::lent HI>ich he has si."lce repeated in public .
the Chancellor sdd some\.fhat despairingly,

11

T.1e best Europeans , 11

livc i11 the United States . "

The remc.rk expressed the disappointnent of many dedicated Europeans at
tr.e failure of

11)C .

It Has also an acknmdedgement of t:1e strenuous but

unsuccessful efforts of this country to secure its acceptance .
It seems to me that the observation, pointed as it is , obscures one
important fact .

Removed as

\le

are from the fears and pressures of the

continent, it is easier to be a dedic ..ted 11 European11 in the United States .
It is easi(;r to ask and even to ask with some impatience,
get together?"

11 \Jhy

don tt they

It is as easy as a !>.ember of Congress urging the elimination

of the tariff on wool, provided his district is

u1

the city of New York .

- 2 -

I

ai:l

afraid , t. erefore, t lB.t I must ta..ko issue ui tn Chancellor

Adcnauer 1 o observation.

Eis great contribution to the cause of \.testern

unity L'l itself, is evidence t.:at the best Europeans live noc in t.1e
United States , but in Europe .
If that "'ere not 1.Le case ti.e future \.fOu.ld hold little promise fol'
the free nations .
tho principal

For it is in ::UZ.ope t:.a.t thcro has unfolded one of

cl~lle~~es

to freedom in our times .

It is in

~urope t.~t

it ru3t be faced and it is prinarily by LUropcans that it must be overcome.
The challenge is the ciJB.llengc of ur.i ty .

The nations of

\~estern

l:.'Uropc are confronted with tne necessity of developing a pattern of pro-·
grcssive integration witnin tne larccr but looser unit; of the Harth
Atlantic CoiJllllU1lity .

If l-iestern ...urope docs devise such a pattern, we

may look forward to an era of peace ancl material proeress and we TNJ..y
anticipate a steady

grO\o~th

of those concepts of tl.e freedoL! of L'.an w...ich

give meanine and dignity to hunan life.

- 3 If Hestern 1\trope fails , .1m1ever, the future proL:.i.scs little more

than an extension of the decade o!: f'"'ar t.1rout;h wnicl ue have just passed.
Sooner or later, in t ..e years ahead lies inevitable war, an age of chaos
and an er.largemcnt of t.1e totalitarian void \.J'1ic}]. already spreads over
va:.;t areas of the globe.

It is possible that the price of failure rray

even be the extinction of human life itnelf .
I

l~ve

deliberately stated the

c.~lloncc

to

~Urope

in the positive

terms of unity ratLer than in tern:.S of defense against the conlJnunist
threat as it is usually defined.

I do so witu a full awareness of the

destructive implications of cor;:munism.

Feu movements in :listory .P.ave

been more erosive of the foundations of our civilization.
The grouth of totalitarian communism, hollever , is more a measure of
the \·ICakness of the free nations , particularly in :!estern Europe, than of
the inherent strength of tile Co!Jl.munist ideolOGY.
recognize and to empl.asize this distinction.

I think it essential to

Failure to do so, is to con-

cede the superiority of totalitarianism over freedom as a motivator of nankind, a concession wLich I , for one, cannot nake.

- 4 -Cor:r.ll!lism has intensified t e need for ...llro ca. ii tet7ation witnin
the larcer cor..1mi..L."'lity of f!"ce nations .
of unity tnat cot:.fronts toe west. .

It ·-·s .i.g :lie .t

t,

C1

.11

Dut only a drulJero s rdc-rea<.tir.g of

:1istory would sucgcc t that cor:.z:ru.nist: crca tnd t.

I.e d .

....ven if cow:.n.mirt

pressures suould abate, as they well rriJ.y co for t.1o mOJ,el t , t1.

urGent

ll<;CC:Jsity for unity would renain.
Twice in t ..is centur-J, our cjv:£.lization has skirted tl,e edge of doom.
'1\:ice our heritac;e ,as been tossed
conflicts bce&n wit..tin .iestern
region .

rccklo~sly

.~:.urope

into the fires of war .

Both

aml both spread groat darracc in that

Coinimminm fed on these co!:'lflacr.J.tious .

ftor the war:; hac burned

themselves out, the col'll:llnists probed anong tl'-' c1.· .rred and s100klng :ruins .
'l'ltey tore do\/n nations and icc.:als \!!uc:1 Lad Lean :>tNCl'cly \.Tcakcncc.l by t.1e
conflicts ; soue mi3ht have been salvagod Lad they not boon subj(;cted to
this second onslaug, t .

'l': at is tue destructive role w.r.ich cor:1l7ll.lnism

occupios in the contemporary world and He roust not lose sight of it.

By the

same token, \1owev(;r, it is essential not to pernit this destructiveness to

- 5 oLscure the fact that ti1e greatest caJW.ge to the free nations has been
largely sclf- inflictedo

It has resulted froLl their o'm inner disunity,

and particularly tho disunity of the

~/estern

European region.

Both great wars of this century, in tile first instance uere atteupted
suicides on the part of \iestern Europe.

The critical danger of corumunism

came after, not before, these massive assaults which the regi on launched upon itself.

And only as a way is found to cope l-Tith tendencies of this kind

will the free nations develop real security against communinm and other
forns of totalitarianism.
The most daneerous of these tendencies is associated Hith the inability
of modern Gernany to find a stable place in the common destiny of l/estern
.uurope .

Hm;.r e..'q>lanations have been offered for this phenomenon.

ians have attributed it to the polic ies of the
Dritis;l and to numerous other causes .

Ger~ans ,

Histor-

the French and the

Regardless at Hhat door or doors

responsibility is laid, however, tnere can be little doubt that t!.is
failure more than any other has gna\..red at
during the last half century.

t~1e

vitals of our civilizati on

- 6It is to t is proble01, t e proble
...x.ropean community that I \:ish
tonig•.t .
to

't.

~o

of Gorr.allJ' ' s place i1 t .

address t.1e 1o.:1iu body of cy rel.:l'.rks

?.ore ".ipecifically, I \:ant to co:1siC:er ..:ith :you t

Dolution

e problm h'l ic .. in proposed in t .•e 1·ecent Londo .-Purio nccor s .

On this solution .1inecs tl e future of .....urope aPt. , in a lru.·.;ur &on~c ,

the fc.te of all t.e :rce

L .... tions .

'l'..c London- Pnris accord::> a . .·e 1 rlnnrily r.:cchanj s.:; i.>y
Ger1rany is to l>e brougf.t into t. e 1.cstcrn uropoo.n a. d

\1

llor~on

ich lestern

.• tlantic

co1. Lur.iti .s on \r•.a t i:; •loped \olill he a :Jtable cntl endw.•:i ng bun is .

In

this respect, i."l principal objective, thct clo Lot differ substrmLially
frou t!.e ..DC .

'fhe differences tl <tt do

netllod and deg:oe of integration.
not as tiGLt as
t .• e ties of a

~.fere

~_;:Xist

In t o preswt accords , the links

conterrqJlated in tl.c :DC .

supranutionalis~.

are esncntio.lly ti one of

Tl~oy

a.~.·e

aro not .... s clearly

•

Tl.c retreat from t:w.t ideal ills been deplored bJ mny in Europe and
in t.lis country.

It is understandable that n:en of t e caliber of Spe.ak of

- 7 Belgium and Schuman of France \Jho had done so much to further
stould be deeply disr.ppoir.ted by tl is developmc.nt .
in noi.. dead e.:1d ·1Ul t.ot di.c.
itzelf fdt in

e\.·c~·ytl ting

urop0anism

The conce}Jt, however,

EUl·opcanism is a force '.Thich \!ill n..ake

tlut mppcns in :m·opc .

Dut

~opeani:::;m,

all great ideals) to croll stron3l;;• n:ust be rootccl L1 t:.e
peopl e "'t'o are to livl.l by ito

1

~.cccpt:;;.nce

like
of the

Ana t.1e simple fact is tr.at •\lropcan inte-

gration of Ue depth cncl degreE:. contemplated in ...:LC \.fas not pos:::;ible at
ti1is time .
At the London-Paris Conferencos, therefore , a s'.tattered promise of
far-reacting unitJ

\o/C.S

exchanged for a

11E:.\T

pror.iso of lesser clincnsions .

In substitutinG the rocent accorua for the d:,G , the £uropcans did not
abr.ndon the it1cal of • uropcan.!.sm nor did t:wy give up anythin& wt.ich tlad
actually been achiovecl towar( s Hs realization .

The retreat, i f i t may

properlJ be called t ' at , was i'r01n a hope not an actuality.

Vie'l-tcd in this

light , the present agreements ere not necessaril.r a step away from unity.
They may yet prove to be a step towards it.

- 8 'i'he apeed with which ;. e London- P.....ris accor s \.ere r
the rejection of

~

c •.cd after

is a tribute to the Buropcanisn of the prcsont leaders

of the cm.tincnt and particularly to Adenc:t.:'"'r , . d .\ and l:on es-F:-ru1c •
It is also striking evidence of t!e vitality
}ost significant, perhaps , it may indicate
Europe that tl e tine to move positively

o:

t:o European iacr. .

widespr~d

to~1:1rds

rcconnition in

integration is no\J or

never .
Under the tern2 of t ..c London-Paris accords t110 people of .lestcrn
Gennny will rct;ain sovereignty and so acbieve
\-Jit11

the other free nations of Europe .

co-cqu~l

nat.;.onal status

\!estern Gorrony \-!ill adhere to

the Brussels Treaty of 19/+8, thereby bccor-.ing a full- fledged mcr.bcr of
tr.e iiestern l!.'uropcan community.

The Ger1 ~ns \Jill also enter directly

into the larGer grouping of the Horth Atlantic Treaty Orr;anization .
of t;;.ese provisions is an interlocking part of a grand ccsign.

"'.ach

Taken

together they hold the promise of providing a stable and r.10re perr.ancnt
place for Gernany in the Hes tern world .

- 9 Also involved
Gerr.:any.

m

the design, '.oHcvcr, is t''e rearw.r:cnt of '.!estern

This question, r:ore t:Jan any ot: er, !.as heretofore stood in

the H?.Y of the integration of :los vern -Urope.

To put t'i e probler.1 bluntly,

r.:any Europeans including Gern:ans have r.a<l doubts o.s to the wisdon of
Gerian roa.rrr.amont .

1'i1ese are not solely "Com:munints doubts , 11 the pur-

po:>es of uhich are clear-- to keep Hcstern Gerrrany defenseless o.nd rj.pe
for totalita.rkn ausorption.

'i'hey are for tho most part the doubts of

sinc01·e people uho il< t:1is generation have lcarn..:d first- 'land to
assocLte t'.c c.ppalling devastation of ue.r '1-til:.l a ruilic.ant GerL:any on the
r.arc

1.

'l'i1e c;rim reminders of this association are still to be seen in

r.:any cities of Europe .

:-.. decade of rebuilaiJlb has not fully obliterated

t 1o scars of war .
From our vanta.ge point in the United States we shou.ld not dismiss
such fears lightlJ.

It is to the credit of the Europoon countries tlat

in spite of t.1cse fears they !lave r")cognizcd tl'e L"llre inn:ec!iate and overwhelr-.ing menece of Soviet e:;,:pansionisr..

They have understood t:lat a disarmed

- 10Gert:lUlly is a ereater dar.gcr to peace than a Ge:n::l!ll'ly with soue cepacit: to
defend itself.

In t!1c London- Per· s accords, lies tern Europe no"r has a plan for
\!est Connan rearmament with certain safeguards.

A neu German netional

army of 500 , 000 men "ri 11 join those of other continental po\lcrs u11der the
l!ATO commander in the common defen3e of the \lest.

\:estern Germany pledr;cs

never to employ these forces to chance existing frontiers or to achieve
Wlific~tion

with eastern

Germ~y .

There are tectnical safcgua.rds aGainst a resUl·c;ent Genncn Itili tarism
in these accords ,.rhich take the form of maxiiiiUI:\ level of forces and prohibitions on the manufacture of certain types of offensive arm.;:.ments :in
Germany.

Perhaps the most significant deterrent houever , is that provided

by the United Kingdom .

The British have committed

airforce to the m.llnland of Europe.

In

f' .•

4 divisions and a tactical

doinc; they have clearly bound

their future uith that of the continent for the f'rst time in centur:ics.
It was a
cally.

tr~~scendcnt

decision and they made it couraceously

~~d

unequivo-

- 11For the first time in modern history the three r;reat po\-lers in the core
of Europe--the United Kir_gdo:n, Gei"'!Ulny c.nd FrD.nce--uill be linked in
specific arrancements for the col:l!llon defense .

The::>e ties are reinforced

by the pledges of continuing concern in Europe 's future Hhich the President and Secretary of State have made on behalf of this

co~~try .

fartnershiR,

I am elad to say, is nov the keynote in our relations \.fi th the :!estern

European countries .
That , in bare outline is the substance of the London-Pari s accords .
In pvYt , the significance of the agreements lies in the provision they

make for the

c~~ation

of 12 German divisions .

I do not mean to suggest

that this increase in the armed po\-/er of Hestern Europe \Jill be decisive
in discouraging a massive Soviet assault on that area .

The deterr ent to

aecression of this type remains , as it has been s:i.nce the end of :Iorld
~Jar

TI, the superiority of the total strength of the free nations as agains t

that of the Soviet bloc .

In this broad equation of pouer, the German

divisions "all not make a substantial difference , for total strength is
measured not only in conventional military factors , but in atomic , economic,
diplom:ttic and others as \/ell .

- 12L'1 m:!l'lY •mys · ·e ha;•e been prep,:u-c · fo
nu.s sive Soviet a.aseult ,

~

d

Cll

te:Jt of totcl. ;.trcngth.

I.n the pres 1t

Adm ' ni3tra.tion tho phrase "inf;tant retal ' c.tion" h.c..s been co ' ned to descri bo at least t!'e atonic aspect of these preparnt · ons .
Communiot advance han contlnucd in
been

~

confound'nG faohion , there l s not

~ ~:ituation

in which t o

rc tc.li~tc

the

c:~lanc.t.:.on

of this dHcr.ar.u?

rlw.t

i~

l:.ut wh ' le the

· nste..ntly .
Tt

n sim)ly tlut the

p..,ttc n of po3t>ro.r Soviet ex_t)c.tr.sion i.sm ho.s not been by mn.ssive c.ssaul t
,.,hich uc hu•:e spent billior.s

~n

prep:J.r· ng to ncct .

has been , as I ment · oncd pre'Jious ly , nn
war- weakened n-:tions .

oxp~nion

. crlh0r, th"! p'1ttern

b;,•

:J c "'.vcnginG D.lllOne

It -i s an ndv"'...lce co.rriod out l::n·c;cly, not by Puss ian

s ol diers --fcH have di ed in comb:J.t since the end of \lorJd 1lar II-- bnt by
millj ons of t he d j sinheri ted , the discontented and the driwm of m"'...ny lands
who have been caught up in t he growing \:eb of internatj onal corm:run · sm.
It :.s with th · s kind of c.n adv.:mce t 1at \:c have hdd the c;1·eatcst diff ·culty in coping in the

~t

enc it is evidr>nt thut the So·•ict Union

had

- 13hoped to ")lllploy the same techniques throuc.;hout a llar- dev:::.statcd Gertl'"·n:' .
The chosen instrmaents were

t~e

and the German communist party .
m;ssion .

rtt•ll :te goverr.ment in the eastern zone
Both havP. fa.i l~d m.i.. serably in their

In the eastern zone , the Derlin riots of 1953 spggest. that the

very existence of the satellite goverrunent depends upon

~ussian

Jn \fc:Jtern Germany , the relllc-:.rke.ble recovery fro.n the wo.r
the area
and

incre~sinGlY

r.pp~ars

b-:tyonots .
to make

invulnerable to coMrnUn1sts tactics of erosion

~nfiltr....tion.

There is , houever , in the East German coi:llllunist :y_:'f'JY and police still
another potential instrU!'lent of co!lr'lunist advance .

It is in deterring a

sudden coup by th:;s force of 250, 000 armed men in a Korean- type internal
aggress.;on , that the proposed Hest German divisions can be most effective .
Tn this limited sense and in linking the German divisions u:ith lTATO ,
the London- Paris accords add to the military bulwark agcinst further communist
penetration of :·!estern Europe .

Important as this contribution may be ,

hoHever , it is not the principal pro::'lise of the acreements .

- 11.-

I be an my rema.r :s ton·
Europe end n
of unity .

t

bJ· s rena •

broa er sense ot er free n t o s ie t h

It is in th os connection that t e lo. on-P

eventually nake their most s ocnificont contribut ' on.
courne must f orst be rat of oed .

Tf these

'he

~he cool~~at ' on

o ·s

reo

nts of

s not enouo .
d nation

tle'r formn.t'on.

a s fulf 'lled , t!>en the accords ca.'l and should

load 11rs t toua.rds :. unif ed
0

pollinG.

a

0

charactc~ · -oc

condition~

~a

c.tif cc..tion clone . hovevor,

They must be carr ' ed out w' th s ome renne of
forcbcar&nce that

pos t

Crm.:lllJ .

1 o issue

n Germany is more co -

It hc..'3 s o fe.r been !'old :l n rca:Jonable IX l"flpcct ve by tho leader0

ship of Cho.ncellor Adenauer.

Evf'n during the d1fficult nontls of drift on

the rutificat oon of EDC , Ac1 enc.uer ir.:Jioted that a un ' ted Germany before f'm
ties had been establis hed with ·'estern Europe could r:oa:1 onl:r a saten· to
Germany .

He stood firm in tho face of mounting polit · cal pressure on t'.e

principle of first things first.

-15Once the London- Pe.r:s cgree:ncnts have been rntifiC'd , l.ouever, i t
may be expected ths.t the demands for unification tTill gro't-1 rapidly :tnside
Gert'.a.'1y .

Uni:'icat:i on

~..rill

inevitably becol'!le tl,e pr5 mary objective of any

sovereicn Gcrm::m eovernment .
in the dcys of Dismark .
political, economic and

:Lt is a valid objective , as val5d today as

The reasons why it must be sought a:re sound in a
no~·cl

sense .

TJntil it is achieved , there can be

little hope of stability i!l :::Urope .
1

t.JX;i

rllJ.t is of p:ri:nary

co~co rn

w.ification ; s pursued.

to ·'estern I:urope and to this country ; s the

:e· have

a right to ; nsi st that the Cerma..r1s seek

their unification peacefully and patiently, with full recognition that Hhat
is at stake is not only their ot-m future but the future of the entire continent; in short , that they continue to follot-1 the course t-1hich has been
set by Adenauer .
So lone as they C.o so , the '·!est Germans Harrant the full support of
\~estern

Et.:.rope and ourselves in the· r queGt for un.ifi c::ttion tri th their

eastern provinces.

:·or is it sufficient jn our policies to pay lip service

to the principle of unification .

It must be cleur to the German people that

-1

the vestem nations ar prep .red to co fr..r in s ttlin
the Soviet un · on .

All prorosals should be

c~lored

s iss

wlic offer

p~

that o unified Ger.nnny shall be e. peaceful and · nd£>pcn ont Gc:rm..rmy a

e o

p·rtic ' pnto n the common development of ruropc and to cooperate uith frrc
n· tions evary'.tbere .
So far tl.o Sov · et Ur.ion has sloun no inclinnt ' on to neaot.:ate GC'rman
un·r · c tion on these tc!'i$ .
be nba.'ldoncd.

1

0!'

do.-.s · t

Th ' o does not ncan thut the objcct've lliU!>t
:1'32.il

that the only altemnt · 1e to .: ~s nbandonwent

is a vestern cqu · valent of the Cocr'lUJlist wnr of 11 l'bere.tion" to recnin the
eastern provinces .
Jt,

is por.sible t h't the Soviet Unio'l l'!'ay be impelled to accept genu · no

Ger man un · r · cation l.Jy a rising tido of
other pres:3Urcs .

publi~

insiotonce in Gormru1y r.nd by

A developmcn1, of th · s k · nd ho\lcver, \.till not como c.n:-3 'ly.

It i::> likely to appear only i!' the policy of the est German government
ru1d tho "estern po\'crs \TitL :-espect to U!'lif ' cat · on o just , restrnined and
co!'lpnssionate .

- 17In the pursuit of such a policy,

free nations.

ti~e

can be on the side of the

There are indications that the to/eight of disunity , dis-

illusion and discontent is being felt on tho communist side .
is so is suggested , for example by the Berlin
incessant flot·r of refugees .

That this

.,.;(>t;~~
¥9til.'t~

l ast year al'ld the

So long as a high rate of economic , political

and social progress is maintained in the western zone , j t is bound to act
as an attraction to thos e Germans living in the e:-.st and the difficulties
of the Soviet Union in
ply.

m:1in"e::.~.ii1G totalit~rion ~ontx·ol

over them Hill multi-

A situation could develop "'here the Soviet pattern of advance into

to/eakness may operate jn reverse .

The Jlussians m11y be compelled to t·rith-

drmr from the ec.stern zone and permit unification not because of military
pressure f rom outside but because of the c-rumbling of their position from
within .
It is possible that the Pussians MaY risk the resurgence of German
milit~r~sm

rather than face the inevitable prospect of a unified Germany

integrated tdth '!estern Europe .

If they choose this course , they are in

a position to make important economic , territorial and other concessions

-18to the G roans.

·~reeve:-,

they could vi thd1 e.w the· r oc upnt on for

expand the nucleus of C-erman mli te..rism which alrc dy
Gorman corm:ru.nist ar:ny.
cation

\tith

GermOJ,s

s

s~ s

';'hey could, in other \'ords , offer Gcnnny e. un fi-

real nationalistic induceme:-:ts and ask in return only tl at t e

~cparate

them.sel ves froo ''estern Europe.

I do not know if a Soviet attempt of

thl~

kind to split the

estern

nations and lay the groundwork for a new \Jorld conflict would succeed .
would depend , I

suppo~e ,

cetenrlbly on the

Gel~~

It

people since they

would tr.ake the final decision for t:nHy or chaos , for peace or ultimate
\lar .

Tho dec is ion , ho\!ever , uould not occur in n vacuum.

covcrncd by many factors none
That

j ~

rno~e sienific~t

a principal reason 'il:Y these

It '·ould 1.:.c

than the London- Paris accords.

acrccmcnt~

must te

so;~cthing

more

than an ingenious device to create 12 Gcrnnn divisions acainst a So·:iet
advance .

They cust

begi~

at once to fulfill their larger promise , tie

promise of proe:nnsive European integration vithin ti.e large:- group'ng of
the North Atlantic co:m:runity .

- 19Under the agreements i.n:m'!ediate progress in this direction Hill have
been made in the integration of tr.e mill tary pouer of the ':E:stern European
nations D.nd of the I:leml::ers of

i~ATO .

It is essential to perfect the::;e

military relationships but that alone is not enough .

The hope of free men

is not only to die together in the defense of freedom if that should be
necessary but to live together in its light .
In this sense , the challenge of unity is much broader than integrated
militur; defense.

It means a deepening of the integration of the \Tes tern

European r:.J.tiol'ls in the

ec.:no:n~. c

field , jn the political field , in all

m.'lttcrs in \-fhich governmenJ.:.s can l::etter serve their ci tizcns by \-forking
tocether rather than separately.

It means , above all , a "'ilHngness to face

couunon problems together and to work tocether with national restraint :l.n
thc:i.r solution.

The need for an approach of this kind is urgent in 1lestem

Europe ; i t is necessary throughout the uestern world; it is desirable uith
all nations who are free to cooperate Hherever they may be on the g:obe .
On my return .Lrom F.uropE: several months ago, I reported to the Fore:i.gn
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Reletions

C~ttee

for

of •he Senate th t t c

a

of special econo::rl.c conferences · • .ich oi ht serve to dcfi:no boldl

5

c

the ccono:nic proble:-s uhich must be overcon:e if the nations of 'esterr- 'Curopo
and the rorth Atlantic Community are to oointain :Jound cconorcic• , and to
lay

th~

groundwork for their solution .

I reiterate that Yicm ton.:..ght.

In doine so , I run u•.•arc that mo3t free nations arc in a rolat · vcly pros-

porous state , but that is precisely the tine to act to avert a collnpse.
And

~~

cc . 1ic

collap~e

could be the shoal on which the hope for unity

would flounder.
Uhc.t , then , if this challenre of unity i:J I!lct?
If this challenr;e is met \le shall see , in my opinion,
of western civilization.
nation~

1

1hcre does · t lead?
aJ1

end to the croaion

l!e shall see a vast gro\lth in the strenuth of !'ree

built not pril!larily on a milit:1ry base , but on the power of the.:..r

crcat·ve accocplishments
fci. th of mankind .

~~d

tho power of their ideals to inspire the

"e shall see a positive but patient leadership in tho

world , a leadership of free men who will not concede that any part of the

- 21humrun race , regardless of its present status is forever beyond the
of liberty.

re~ch

:re shall see , in short , the beginning of a ne'\or cycle and

I trust a peaceful cycle , in the never- cndins strugele bett·Teen tyranny
and freedom .

This cycle ,.,ill belons to freedom .

